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1. The Sellarsian view of philosophy: a brief review
Sellars’ views on the epistemic status of philosophical propositions are not generally
well known. In fact, they have not even advanced to the point of being acknowledged as
such among others in the «logical space» of metaphilosophical discourse within analytic
philosophy. This is unfortunate, since Sellars’ metaphilosophical views are extremely
interesting and can certainly contribute to a better understanding of familiar
metaphilosophical puzzles.
The most frequently quoted passage about Sellars’ metaphilosophical views by his
commentators1 is the (by now famous) first sentence of his article «Philosophy and the
Scientific Image of Man»: 
«Τhe aim of philosophy, abstractly formulated, is to understand how things, in the
broadest possible sense of the term, hang together, in the broadest possible sense of the
term».2
According to these commentators, the best way to achieve this ideal coherence of our
conceptual system as a whole is to focus our attention on two competing conceptual
systems that exist (in the mode of Weberian «ideal types») in our epistemic
practices –the «manifest image» and the «scientific image»– and try to understand how
it can be shown that these two ways of understanding reality are not necessarily opposed
to one another, but can actually be «stereoscopically» synthesized in a single coherent
experience of reality. 
But why these two images of man-in-the-world seem to be in essential conflict with
one another? To see this we must first briefly explain the terms «manifest image» and
«scientific image». The manifest image expresses man’s understanding of reality and its
place in it before the advent of scientific method. The basic objects of the manifest image
(i.e. the objects which cannot be reduced to more basic entities/objects in that image) are
persons: Human beings conceived as single (i.e. non-reducible) logical and metaphysical
subjects that have the capacity to act on the basis of reasons within a world governed by
natural laws.3 The most important characteristic of the manifest image is the radical,
unbridgeable logical and ontological gap within it between the way it construes human
behaviour and action (normative, holistic, conceptual, explained by reasons) and its
conception of the nature and properties of «sub-personal» human parts (e.g. the brain),
states (e.g. impulses), or the behaviour of animal organisms and inanimate, «merely
material» objects (non-normative, non-conceptual, merely conforming to natural laws -
or, to «lower instincts» in the case of animals). On the other hand, according to the
scientific image the best way to understand (explain) the behaviour of perceptible
objects and properties, including human behaviour, is to postulate the existence of
certain unobservable entities, which are essentially understood as being non-normative
1 See e.g. BerNSTeIN (1966), DeVrIeS & TrIPleTT (2000), roSeNBerg (2007) and o’SheA (2007).
2 SellArS, W. (1963b): «Philosophy and the Scientific mage of Man», in Science, Perception and Reality,
london, routledge, p.1
3 of course, this does not mean that persons always act on the basis of reasons, but that even if their
actions can sometimes be understood as being the outcome of non-rational factors (impulses), persons always
have the capacity to overcome their non-rational impulses or inclinations and act on the basis of reasons.
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and non-conceptual in nature (Sellars 1963b, 9, 21). In this way, the tension between
these two images –these two ways of understanding the world and our place in it–
becomes obvious, for instance in the way they construe human behaviour: within the
manifest image this kind of behaviour is understood as being essentially normative,
holistically structured and conceptual (the relevant explanatory level being that of
persons and their capacities to act), whereas, in the scientific image it is construes as
being essentially non-normative and non-conceptual (that is, it is explained in terms of
«pre-personal» mechanisms or processes). 
But how can these two equally basic images of man-in-the-world be reconciled? At
this point, Sellars makes a decisive theoretical move: First, he identifies the paradigmatic
«phenomena» which are described and explained by the basic categorial concepts of the
manifest image framework. These «phenomena» form the central core of our sense of
«personhood» and include such basic activities characteristic of our «form of life» as
perceptual experience, rational thought and action. Sellars key move here is to construe
all the above basic human activities as essentially normative (as opposed to their being
only descriptive of certain states of affairs in the world or of human behaviour). He then
asserts that this common fundamental feature in terms of which the «essence» (or,
«grammar») of our personhood is articulated –i.e. its «normativity»– does not even
«come into view» if it is construed in terms of concepts that belong to the scientific
image. That is, if normativity is thought of in causal-explanatory terms –as capable of
receiving or providing an adequate causal explanation of events in spatiotemporal
reality– its own normative force, i.e. what defines it as such, simply evaporates (Sellars
1953b, §66, 1957, §79-80). 
Now, as is well known, Sellars also contends that «in the dimension of describing
and explaining the world, science is the measure of all things, of what it is that it is, and
of what it is not that it is not».4 It seems, therefore, that normativity is completely
eliminated from an inventory of the basic ontological categories (categorial concepts)
with which the spatiotemporal world is adequately described and explained, and, in a
sense, this is indeed Sellars’ position. But, does this mean that normative «phenomena»
are just «useful fictions» and not in any way real? Do they not, for example, have
objectively identified conditions of correct on incorrect application? In Sellars’ view, an
eliminativist account of normativity would indeed be correct only if the job of normative
discourse was to describe and explain states of affairs in the world (or, in the mind).
However, according to Sellars the function of normative phenomena in our practices is
different from that of describing and explaining states of affairs in the world. Normative
«phenomena» do not describe or explain a sui generis, non-empirical, transcendent or
transcendental kind of reality (beyond or «besides» the contingent spatiotemporal
world); their job is to prescribe and evaluate (not describe or explain) human behaviour
(see e.g. Sellars 1957, §79). A system of normative prescriptions is not an explanatory
theory for the description of reality (or the mind), but rather a «coordination» system
which aims at motivating actions for changing reality. And, in this precise sense,
normative «phenomena» can indeed be considered as real and not reducible to the
scientific image (although, as we saw, it can equally be said, without contradiction, that
4 SellArS, W. (1997): Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind, Cambridge Mass, harvard University
Press, §41
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normative «phenomena» themselves can be adequately explained only with the use of
scientific image –i.e. non-normative– concepts)5 (see also O’Shea 2010, 459-70).
But what does Sellars achieve philosophically by making the above theoretical
«move»? Two things, basically: 1) He is in a position to argue that normative discourse
is genuinely contentful, in the sense that it is a pragmatically ineliminable feature of our
«form of life» and cannot be conceptually/semantically reduced to non-normative
discourse, while 2) at the same time, he is in a position to drain normative «phenomena»
of their supposed «sui generis» ontological import. Normativity should not be
ontologically reified. If it were, this would mean that we ought to be committed
ontologically to the existence of certain abstract entities (in the world or in the mind)
with causal powers which cannot (logically cannot) be accounted for in scientific terms.
But is not the idea of normative abstract entities that have the capacity to causally
change physical (non-normatively structured) processes, by exerting direct causal force
of a sui generis kind («normative», «teleological», «transcendental»?) which falls
outside the scope of any actual and possible empirical-scientific redescription and
explanation for a priori philosophical reasons, at least suspect of reinstating a highly
dubious, to say the least, doctrine of philosophy as a special kind of resolutely non-
empirical investigation, which, somehow manages to be of relevance to the contingent
happenings of the (physical, biological, historical, ordinary) world?6
One may wonder by now about the relevance of all the above-mentioned Sellarsian
views to the issue of the epistemic status of specifically philosophical propositions, i.e.
5 This, again, can be the case precisely because the function of normative discourse and, therefore, the
sense in which it is not reducible to non-normative discourse is different from that of describing and explaining
states of affairs in the world. In fact, this Sellarsian thesis is the key for a proper answer to a classic objection
levelled against the view that it is possible to explanatorily reduce normative phenomena to non-normative
phenomena. According to this objection this reduction is conceptually impossible, since it changes the subject;
what is actually explained in terms of non-normative phenomena is not normative phenomena as such, but
rather their non-normative correlates (see e.g. TUrNer 2010: 186-92). however, this critique overlooks the fact
that, in Sellars view, when one tries to understand the relations between the normative and the non-normative
level the latter does not completely disappear from view; it remains absolutely intact, provided that its special
mode of understanding ourselves and the world is conceived not in descriptive or explanatory terms, but rather
in prescriptive and justificatory terms which aim at regulating our actions. Normativity disappears from view
only if it is understood exclusively in descriptive and explanatory terms.
6 This decidedly non-empirical conception of philosophy is often masqueraded as being «therapeutic» in
form, i.e. as a philosophy which, at first sight, seems to get closer to what human experience «really is» (the
«ordinary», our «everyday dealings» with the world etc.) and is considered to be pluralistic and «humble» in
its aspirations. This humility, in turn, is supposed to follow from the fact that on this view, unlike traditional
«imperialistic» metaphilosophical doctrines concerning the relations of philosophy and science, the space of
philosophy is conceived as being strictly separated from the space of the sciences; it is restricted in its own
domain of authority and does not deal directly with the domain of empirical objects or beings. And, on the
basis of this double move of separation and restriction of philosophy from the sciences it is concluded that
philosophy can, in its own restricted domain of «objects» invert ordinary empirical and scientific grounding
relations by providing a sui generis ground for its «objects» (see e.g. PADUI 2011, 97) (this «grounding»
relation can take many forms: the phenomenological constituted «lifeworld» (late husserl, Merleau-Ponty), the
ekstatic relation between Sein and Dasein (heidegger) and even our ordinary conception of us as persons
«opened» to the layout of reality through perceptual experience and action (McDowell)). however, it is not at
all clear how this «separatist» move can bring into existence a domain of objects and relations (of whatever
epistemic or non-epistemic (e.g. practical) sort holding between them and the subject) which can have some
kind of sui generis efficacy in the actual world and at the same time be in principle impervious to actual or
possible redescription or reconceptualization as regards their content in light of explanatory demands in the
course of empirical inquiry. 
5 Christias:Anthony Bonner  11/04/16  12:21  Página 56
TAUlA 46 57
to questions like the following: are philosophical propositions capable of being true or
false, right or wrong, like ordinary empirical propositions? Do they share the same
logical form with empirical propositions (the only difference being that the former are
much more general than the latter)? Are they a priori propositions, necessarily true? Are
they more like synthetic a priori propositions?
The quick answer to the question of relevance posed above is that the way Sellars
construes and attempts to solve the metaphilosophical issue about the epistemic status of
philosophical propositions is analogous to the way he deals with the problem of
reconciling the manifest and the scientific image of man-in-the-world. As we shall see,
the key move in both cases is to distinguish between different ways in which certain
propositions may be used in our practices (e.g. normative/prescriptive versus
factual/descriptive use) although they seem at first sight to share the same logical form. 
2. Philosophical propositions are normative, not factual/descriptive
According to Sellars, philosophical propositions (such as «Red is a property»,
«Every change presupposes an enduring substance», «Every experience is someone’s
experience», «If the world is deterministic, then there is no free will») do not function
as (special kinds of) factual propositions, that is, as descriptions or claims about the
existence of certain states of affairs in the world. If they were, they would commit us to
the existence of sui generis, non-empirical, metaphysically or «transcendentally»
necessary facts in the world. The fact that philosophical propositions have the same
«surface» grammatical form as factual-descriptive propositions, such as «This table is
red», deceives us into believing that they share the same logical form, but that is not
quite right, since their functional role within our system of beliefs as a whole is quite
different from the functional role of factual-descriptive propositions. 
Indeed, Sellars suggests that some of the most important philosophical errors of both
traditional rationalism and empiricism stem from their common underlying and
unquestioned assumption to the effect that the logical form of philosophical propositions
is the same as that of factual-descriptive propositions. The rationalist doctrine according
to which philosophical propositions refer to some kind of independent reality which is
non-contingent in nature is a natural outcome of the above assumption –i.e. that
philosophical propositions are descriptive-factual in form– combined with the
assumption that, philosophical propositions, unlike factual ones, do not seem to be
contingent. For example, if the proposition «Red is a property» is interpreted in this way
it commits us ontologically to the existence of a non-empirical reality, populated by
abstract entities such as «redness». It is precisely ontological commitments of this
(decidedly non-empirical) kind that Sellars wants to bring to light and expose as
problematic.7 On the other hand, philosophers with empiricist proclivities do not believe
7 Another reason why Sellars objects to the assimilation of philosophical propositions to factual ones is that,
besides or, rather, because of the fact that it leads to the postulation of the above non-empirical ontology, it
also leads to a problematic epistemology: in order to explain how is it possible for us to be in touch with those
absolutely necessary and non-empirical abstract entities we are forced to postulate that the mind can somehow
directly and immediately (that is, without the mediation of other knowledge) grasp those abstract entities and
their properties and relations. But this kind of immediate apprehension is one of the main forms of the myth
of the given, which is the main target of Sellars’ work as a whole.
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that this non-empirical and metaphysically necessary reality exists, but, precisely
because they agree with rationalists that philosophical propositions are descriptive-
factual in (logical) form, they reject the rationalist view that their epistemic status is that
of necessary propositions, holding instead that they are empirical generalizations (with
a very high degree of generality, but contingent nonetheless) –misconstruing thereby, on
Sellars view, their logical form and function, which is essentially non-factual (non-
descriptive), but normative (see e.g. Sellars 1947, §3-5).
Pace rationalism and empiricism, Sellars holds that philosophical propositions are
practical and normative in nature.8 They are proposals9 about proper linguistic usage,
in the sense that they propose how the concepts in the context of our linguistic, or, more
specifically, epistemic practices ought to be used –what their meaning ought to be– in
order for us to be able to achieve the following practical –and, at the same time,
epistemic– goal: The mastery of a practical skill («to know our way around» is Sellars’
phrase) in our interaction with «things» and the way they «hang together» within reality
(in the broadest possible senses of the terms «thing» and «hang together»), which
nevertheless differs from the usual, non-reflective practical skills precisely in that it can
be fully mastered only if reflective understanding is essentially involved in the process
of mastering it (Sellars 1963b, 1). And the content of this reflective understanding in
precisely the «stereoscopic» synthesis of the manifest and the scientific image of man-
in-the-world. 
In other words, philosophical propositions function as normative proposals about the
use that philosophical concepts ought to have in language. (For example, the content of
the philosophical proposition «Red is a property, not a thing (substance)» is not an
assertion about the existence of an abstract entity («redness») in the world but a proposal
about how the concept «red» ought to function in language: It ought to be used as a
predicate, not as a subject).10 And what they propose is that the conceptual network of
8 Sellars does not explicitly connect the normative-practical character of philosophical propositions with
their role as proposals for changing current linguistic usage, and, in that sense, what is claimed here is an
interpretation of the Sellarsian position on the epistemic status of philosophical propositions/theses. This
interpretation, however, is grounded in explicitly formulated Sellarsian theses as regards the normative-
practical character of philosophical theses (see e.g. SellArS 1947, §1-6, 1963b, 1-5) and their metalinguistic
function (SellArS 1963c, XI), and just attempts to draw its logical consequences. Moreover, Sellars himself
views propositions as actions which propose something (SellArS 1973, 181-2) but does not expand his account
to cover the cases of specifically philosophical propositions. The view that, according to Sellars, philosophical
propositions are normative and practical in nature has also been defended by deVries (2005, 7-8, 19-22).
9 Notice that to be a «proposition» literally means «to propose» something.
10 The idea that philosophical concepts refer to the concepts of a language (the «object-language», the
concepts of which are about the world), and not directly to the world itself that is, the view that philosophical
propositions belong to the «metalanguage» comes from Carnap (See CArNAP 2002, 302-307). There, one can
find the following examples of philosophical propositions. 1) «The moon is a thing; five is not a thing, but a
number», 2) «A thing is a complex of sense-data». According to Carnap, the real (metalinguistic) content of
those philosophical propositions, which at first sight seem to belong to the object-language, is the following:
1) «“Moon” is a thing-word; “five” is not a thing-word, but a number-word», 2) «every sentence in which a
thing-designation occurs is equipollent to a class of sentences in which no thing-designations but sense-data
designations occur». But Sellars’ interpretation of the epistemic status of philosophical propositions differs
from Carnap’s in that 1) Sellars’ metaliguistic construal of philosophical discourse does not aim to describe
the structure of the object-language, but rather, to reform it, and 2) although Sellars, agrees with Carnap’s view
that the justification of the normative, metalinguistic content of philosophical propositions is something which
calls for a decision, unlike Carnap, he contends that it is generally sensible to ask of a decision «is it
reasonable?» or «can it be justified?», and these questions call for an assertion rather than a decision (SellArS,
1974, 247).
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the inferential (internal) relations in which the concepts that are used in philosophical
propositions stand to each other is inferentially structured in such a way that the adoption
of this particular system of philosophical propositions (and concepts) as our basic
linguistic «tool» to orient ourselves in our multifarious ordinary linguistic practices can
make the way we relate to the world –our conception of independent reality and our
place in– non-problematic on a practical (and not only theoretical) level, but in a
reflective way. Moreover, precisely because in most cases the proposals for the correct
usage of the concepts used in philosophical propositions differ from what competent
speakers of our current linguistic practices would deem as a correct usage of these terms,
it can be argued that these philosophical propositions ultimately aim at changing the use
of language on the grounds that this change is a necessary means for the achievement of
the above central goal of philosophy.11
3. Philosophical propositions as material rules of inference
As we saw above, according to Sellars, philosophical propositions function as
normative proposals about the use that philosophical concepts ought to have in
language. I take it that this metaphilosophical view can be fruitfully extended if we
compare philosophical propositions with what Sellars calls «material» rules of
inference. Philosophical propositions function as material rules of inference –i.e. as rules
of correctly inferring empirical propositions of a certain type from empirical
propositions of another type. This interpretive move of ours about the function of
philosophical propositions in Sellars’s system is based on the fact that, for Sellars,
philosophical propositions are normative, not descriptive, combined with the further
Sellarsian view to the effect that normatively characterized propositions can function
either as material or as «formal» rules of inference (Sellars 1954, §28-29). Therefore, if
philosophical propositions are not construed as truths of formal logic (which they are
not, according to Sellars (1967, II)) it follows that they function as material rules of
inference. According to this construal the philosophical proposition «Red is a property,
not a thing» is a material rule which licences the inference from empirical propositions
about colours to empirical propositions about attributes of things, and prohibits the
inference to empirical propositions about substances. And, in this sense, classical
philosophical disputes –e.g. about the nature of personal identity– can be understood as
disputes about what material inferences we ought to acknowledge as correctly
articulating the content of the concept in question –in this case, the content of the
concept «same person»– and why (see also Brandom 2009, 120-23). 
11 It should be stressed at this point that, according to our analysis, philosophical propositions are not
descriptions of any kind. They are not descriptions of worldly states of affairs, nor are they descriptions of
«linguistic» states of affairs, i.e. of the way in which philosophical concepts are actually used in the context of
our current (non-philosophical) linguistic practices. Philosophical propositions function as rules for the correct
use of philosophical concepts, in the sense that they propose how we ought to use them (what their correct and
incorrect application ought to be) in order to satisfy the central goal of philosophy.
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But why exactly are material rules of inference called «material» and how are they
differentiated from «formal» rules of inference? According to Sellars, the validity of
«material» rules of inference depends on the content of the non-logical terms of the
propositions involved (that is why they are called «material»), whereas in the case of
«formal» rules of inference it depends solely on the meaning of the logical terms
involved (Sellars 1953a, I).
Now, the interesting thing about viewing philosophical propositions as (special kinds
of) material rules of inference is that this view can explain why philosophical
propositions resemble both analytic and «synthetic» propositions, without belonging to
either of those epistemic categories. The concept of a «material» rule of inference is
tailor-made to do exactly this job. This becomes obvious if we notice that 1) a
consequence of the definition of the concept of a material rule of inference above is that
the denial of a material rule of inference is not a formal contradiction, and further
observe that 2) this does not mean that propositions which express material rules of
inference function like ordinary empirical propositions either. A denial of an ordinary
empirical proposition only changes its truth value, whereas the denial of a material rule
affects (changes) the very meaning of the terms which express it (Sellars 1953a, III). 
Sellars is mostly known for his application of the concept of a material rule to
inferences that involve empirical concepts (such as «If x is copper, then x is a good
conductor of electricity», «If there were to be a flash of lightning, there would be
thunder»). In this way he tried to highlight the fact that when these empirical concepts
are used in the formulation of natural laws or are conceived of as standing e.g. in
relations of cause and effect, they are thereby conceptually (not just empirically-
externally) related. (Think, for example, the concepts of mass, force and acceleration in
Newton’s first law of motion or the relation of perfectly ordinary empirical concepts like
«rain», «street» and «wet» in the proposition «If it rains, the streets will be wet».) More
generally, Sellars held that material inferences of the above form are «essential to any
conceptual frame which permit the formulation of such subjunctive conditionals as do
not give expression to logical principles of inference»12 (emphasis mine).13 Therefore,
for Sellars, material inferences are involved in the content of every empirical concept of
ours. However, the content of philosophical concepts is clearly not the same as that of
empirical concepts. In what sense, then, can philosophical propositions be considered as
(a special kind of) material rules of inference? 
Clearly the sense in which philosophical propositions are material (rather than
formal) rules of inference is different from that in which empirical propositions function
as material rules. For example, philosophical propositions do not have the status of
natural laws and do not express relations of cause and effect. Notice, though, that this is
a distinction between two types of material inference, highlighting thereby the fact that
philosophical propositions do not function as formal inferences; they are not analytic
propositions of formal logic. The above distinction can be justified if one takes into
12 SellArS, W. (1953a): «Inference and Meaning», Mind, 62, III.
13 And, as Sellars, in the same passage, reminds us «we are all conscious of the key role played by in the
sciences, both formal and empirical, in detective work and in the ordinary course of living by subjunctive
conditionals».
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consideration the fact that the interests and purposes which motivate the «philosophical
language game» (the stereoscopic synthesis of the manifest and the scientific image) are
clearly different from those that motivate purely empirical inquiry. 
However, by being precisely material inferences, philosophical propositions
resemble empirical propositions which function as material inferences (e.g. «Copper is
a good conductor of electricity») in that the validity of both depends on the meaning of
the non-logical terms involved. The validity of the former, exactly like that of the latter,
is not a function of explicit definitions or relations of synonymy between its terms
(Sellars 1967, II). From that point of view, philosophical propositions are not, strictly
speaking, analytic –although they do resemble analytic propositions in that their
negation, far from showing that they are false in a straightforward empirical sense, is
actually an indication of not having understood their meaning or of attempting to change
it. Both of these epistemic characteristics –which, when combined, make philosophical
propositions look like (potentially revisable) «synthetic a priori» principles– can again
be readily explained in terms of their function as material rules of inference.
On the other hand, as was mentioned above, the specifically philosophical material
inferences differ from the «empirically oriented» material inferences (e.g. of the form «If
it rains, the streets will be wet») in that the non-logical terms on the meaning of which
the validity of the philosophical proposition depends are not used in the same way as
empirical terms (they are not part of the same practice). Ultimately, this is because
empirical inquiry has a specific subject-matter (the investigation of non-logical
contingent truths about particular matters of fact in the actually existing world), and no
practical inquiry with a domain-specific subject-matter –be it empirical, mathematical,
logical, aesthetic or what have you– can be identified as such (i.e. in abstraction from its
relation to our worldview as a whole) with philosophical inquiry; the latter, according to
Sellars, is an inquiry in the widest possible sense of the term, concerning our cognitive
and practical «orientation» to reality as a whole14 (thus, according to this line of thought,
even if Sellars’ identification of the central goal of philosophy is wrong or only part of
the story, philosophical inquiry would still be different from any other kind of inquiry
with a specific subject-matter).
As Sellars himself notes, «[...] philosophy, in an important sense, does not have a
specific subject-matter, which stands to it as other subject-matters stand to other
disciplines».15 In this connection he also aptly states that «the specialist knows his way
around in his own neighbourhood, as his neighbourhood, but doesn’t know his way
around in it in the same way as a part of the landscape as a whole».16 It is exactly the
abovementioned form of knowledge (knowing our way around in each «intellectual
neighbourhood» as a part of the intellectual landscape as a whole) that distinguishes the
philosopher from the reflective specialist and which differentiates the content of
philosophical concepts from that of every other special discipline or inquiry.
14 It seems therefore that the defining criterion on the basis of which we can distinguish between different
types of material inferences is the needs, interests and purposes of the overall practice (or «form of life») in
which each material inferential network is caught up.
15 SellArS, W. (1963b): «Philosophy and the Scientific mage of Man», in Science, Perception and Reality,
london, routledge, 2.
16 Ibíd., 4.
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Interestingly, this fact has consequences as regards the way in which philosophical
propositions function as «synthetic a priori» principles. We saw above that propositions
which function as material rules of inference can be regarded as «synthetic a priori»,
since 1) their validity is not a function of explicit definitions or relations of synonymy
between its terms (therefore, they are not, strictly speaking, analytic), and 2) their
negation, far from showing that they are false in a straightforward empirical sense, is
actually an indication of not having understood their meaning or of attempting to change
it (therefore, they are not synthetic a posteriori propositions). However, this «synthetic
a priori» status holds equally for propositions which express material rules of inference
in general, regardless of whether those inferences involve empirical or philosophical
concepts. It was, then, pointed out that the crucial criterion on the basis of which one can
differentiate between «philosophical» and «empirically oriented» material inferences
(such as laws of nature, relations of cause and effect, etc.) is the needs, interests and
purposes of the overall practice (or «form of life») in which each material inferential
network is caught up. And this fact points to the way in which the synthetic a priori
status of philosophical material inferences differs from the synthetic a priori status of
«empirical» material inferences. The «philosophical» synthetic a priori is «more» a
priori and «less» synthetic, so to speak, than the «empirically oriented» synthetic a
priori. In fact, Sellars himself explicitly states, in his paper «Some Remarks on Kant’s
Theory of Experience» (1967), that statements which are absolutely central to the
formulation of a philosophical theory, e.g. those of Kant’s «transcendental logic»
according to which objects of empirical knowledge conform to logically synthetic
universal principles in the modality of necessity, are not themselves –on pain of
circularity– cases of synthetic a priori truths (in the sense of what we termed
«empirically oriented» synthetic a priori truths), but are analytic truths of a special kind:
«illuminating analytic truths, far removed from the trivialities established by the
unpacking of “body” into “extended substance” and “brother” into “male sibling”».17
Sellars also states, in this connection, that philosophical investigation at the highest level
of abstraction aims to «explicate the concept of a mind that gains knowledge of the world
of which it is a part»,18 or, in other words, it is «the theory of what it is to be a language
that is about a world in which it is used».19 This is, in its specifics, the way the «synthetic
a priori» status of «philosophical» material inferences –which, at this level of abstraction
is interchangeable with that of «illuminating» analytic propositions– differs from the
«synthetic a priori» status of «empirically oriented» material inferences. The difference,
as we show above, comes down to a difference in scope of subject-matter, and it is
intimately connected to the –already mentioned– fact that «philosophy, in an important
sense, does not have any specific subject-matter, which stands to it as other subject-
matters stand to other disciplines».20
17 SellArS, W. (1967): «Some remarks on Kant’s Theory of experience», Journal of Philosophy, 64, II
18 Ibíd., II
19 Ibíd., IX
20 SellArS, W. (1963b): «Philosophy and the Scientific mage of Man», in Science, Perception and Reality,
london, routledge, 2
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4. Concluding remarks
In conclusion, the main thesis of this paper can be summarized as follows: Sellars
maintains that philosophical propositions are normative and practically oriented. That is,
they are not understood as being exclusively «theoretical» in character, in a sense that
would radically disconnect them from our social practices.21 The cash value of the
function of philosophical propositions –i.e. their role as proposed material rules of
inference or (potentially revisable) synthetic a priori principles– is not that of
formulating a theory for the description of reality (or, of linguistic practice), but rather,
that of motivating actions which aim at changing (linguistic, and through that, extra-
linguistic) reality. As Sellars himself observes (about science, but, I think it can equally
be applied to philosophy), paraphrasing Marx: «Natural philosophers have hitherto
sought to understand “meanings”; the task is to change them».22
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